<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<feed xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom" xml:lang="en">
  <title>Trestle Articles</title>
  <subtitle>Guides on finding, fixing, and preventing leaked secrets: responding when a key leaks, how secret scanning works, and how Trestle can help.</subtitle>
  <link href="https://trestlescan.com/atom.xml" rel="self" />
  <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/" />
  <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/</id>
  <updated>2026-06-30T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
  <author><name>Trestle</name><uri>https://trestlescan.com/</uri></author>
  <entry>
    <title>AST vs regex secret scanning: what each approach catches and misses</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/ast-vs-regex-secret-scanning/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/ast-vs-regex-secret-scanning/</id>
    <published>2026-06-30T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-30T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>Regex matches known key formats and entropy scoring catches high-randomness strings, but both miss generic passwords and raise false positives on ordinary code. Parser-based scanning reads code structure and catches what patterns miss, while regex stays the better choice for fixed-format keys.</summary>
    <category term="Secret scanning" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>The B1-B4 trust boundary model for AI coding agents</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/b1-b4-trust-boundaries/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/b1-b4-trust-boundaries/</id>
    <published>2026-06-29T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-29T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>A pipeline threat model maps AI coding agent security onto four boundaries, from the developer&apos;s prompt to production: what each boundary is, the threats and control at each, and where hardcoded secrets fit.</summary>
    <category term="AI agent security" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Deleting a secret and committing again isn&apos;t enough</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/deleting-secret-is-not-enough/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/deleting-secret-is-not-enough/</id>
    <published>2026-06-26T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-26T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>If you deleted a committed secret and pushed again, the secret still works. The old value stays in your git history, in forks, and in clones. The only fix is to replace the key.</summary>
    <category term="Incident response" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>How fast are leaked API keys found?</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/how-fast-are-leaked-keys-found/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/how-fast-are-leaked-keys-found/</id>
    <published>2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-25T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>On public GitHub, a leaked API key is found and used within minutes, sometimes within one minute. You can&apos;t outrun it, so replace the key first, not the commit.</summary>
    <category term="Threat research" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Leaked secret emergency checklist</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/leaked-secret-checklist/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/leaked-secret-checklist/</id>
    <published>2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-24T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>A do-it-now checklist for a leaked API key, token, or password: contain it, check for misuse, and prevent a repeat. Replace the key first. Optionally, clean it out of your git history.</summary>
    <category term="Incident response" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>API key leak prevention: how to keep secrets out of your code</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/api-key-leak-prevention/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/api-key-leak-prevention/</id>
    <published>2026-06-22T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-22T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>A practical, vendor-neutral guide to API key leak prevention: why credentials leak, what it costs, and the layered defenses that stop secrets from escaping your codebase.</summary>
    <category term="Guide" />
  </entry>
  <entry>
    <title>Four secret scanners compared on four codebases</title>
    <link href="https://trestlescan.com/articles/secret-scanners-compared/" />
    <id>https://trestlescan.com/articles/secret-scanners-compared/</id>
    <published>2026-06-17T01:00:00.000Z</published>
    <updated>2026-06-17T01:00:00.000Z</updated>
    <summary>Trestle, Gitleaks, TruffleHog, and detect-secrets run with default settings over four public codebases. Every scanner catches an obvious API key. The differences show up with the secrets that don&apos;t look like secrets: hashed passwords, weak passwords, credit card numbers, and values that get sent to the browser.</summary>
    <category term="Tool comparison" />
  </entry>
</feed>
